Pakistani Writer Says U.S. Setback Has Strengthened Iran’s Regional Position

In an opinion piece reported by Iran’s IRNA, Khurram Hussain argues that the conflict has reached an impasse around the Strait of Hormuz and that Iran’s emergence as a regional power is now difficult to reverse.

Published: Sep 19, 2026, 12:40 PMUpdated: Sep 19, 2026, 12:40 PM
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Pakistani Writer Says U.S. Setback Has Strengthened Iran’s Regional Position
Summary

Pakistani economist and writer Khurram Hussain argues in a Dawn column, as reported by IRNA, that the conflict involving the United States, Israel and Iran has reached an impasse around the Strait of Hormuz and has strengthened Iran’s regional position. He compares Iran’s potential emergence with China’s return to the international system after détente and predicts greater pressure on Gulf monarchies. The supplied report provides no independent verification of the military and political claims.

A Pakistani writer has argued that Iran’s regional influence has been strengthened by what he describes as the failure of a U.S.-Israeli military campaign, while warning that the next stage of the confrontation could reshape relations between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states.

The comments were attributed to economist and writer Khurram Hussain in a column titled “The Rise of Iran,” published in Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper and reported by Iran’s state-run Islamic Republic News Agency, or IRNA, on September 19, 2026. Hussain’s assessment presents the conflict as having moved from an active military campaign into a stalemate centered on the Strait of Hormuz.

According to the report, Hussain wrote that the “coalition war” involving the United States and Israel against Iran had effectively ended. He described the situation around the strategically important waterway as a deadlock and said that the more significant political contest would begin after the United States leaves the region.

In his analysis, the consequences would then fall particularly on Arab governments, which would face the political and economic effects of the war. Hussain argued that Washington had failed to achieve all of its stated military objectives since the campaign began in February, while Iran had demonstrated an ability to withstand pressure despite decades of sanctions and threats of war.

The column portrays that outcome as evidence of a broader shift in the regional balance of power. Hussain wrote that a major power was emerging in West Asia and that Iran, previously confined behind what he called a “wall of sanctions,” was now developing into a major regional force.

He compared Iran’s current trajectory with China’s position after the period of détente. In Hussain’s account, China had experienced international restrictions and isolation after the 1949 revolution, but détente created a negotiated route back into the international community. Subsequent domestic reforms, he argued, helped China move toward global-power status.

Hussain nevertheless said Iran’s return to the international system would be more turbulent than China’s experience. He attributed that difference to Iran’s need to resist and overcome the isolation imposed after the Islamic Revolution. On that basis, he predicted that Iran would emerge as a regional power in one of the world’s most strategically important areas.

The writer also linked Iran’s expected postwar position to the Gulf monarchies. The IRNA report says he argued that, after the reported death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and what he described as Iran’s victory over a U.S.-Israeli coalition, Tehran would turn its attention toward the rulers of the Gulf states.

Hussain further claimed that Iran would seek compensation for wartime damage and that the demand should no longer be dismissed, including by the United States. He wrote that Iran would retain control of the Strait of Hormuz and press its claims in the coming days. If Washington concluded that continuing the confrontation no longer served its interests, he argued, the Gulf rulers would be left to pay the political and financial cost.

The Strait of Hormuz is central to the argument presented in the column. Hussain’s analysis treats control over the waterway as a source of leverage for Iran and as a factor that could influence the calculations of the United States and the Gulf monarchies. However, the supplied report does not provide independent evidence detailing the status of the strait, the military balance, the nature of any compensation demand, or the positions of the governments involved.

Hussain concluded that Iran’s emergence as a major regional power had become an irreversible process unless the U.S.-Israeli coalition took another catastrophic action. Although he considered such a scenario unlikely at the time of writing, he did not rule it out entirely.

The claims in the column represent Hussain’s interpretation of the conflict and its possible consequences. The supplied IRNA report does not independently verify his assertions about the end of the war, the failure of U.S. military objectives, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, the reported death of Iran’s supreme leader, or the prospect of compensation from Gulf states. It also does not include responses from U.S., Israeli, Iranian or Gulf authorities. As a result, the article’s central conclusion—that Iran’s rise as a regional power is now unstoppable—should be understood as the writer’s political and strategic assessment rather than an independently established fact.