Netanyahu Seeks to Turn the ‘Saudi Card’ into an Election Advantage

As Israel’s 27 October 2026 Knesset election approaches, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly seeking to turn regional security developments into a political asset. At the center of that effort is Saudi Arabia: a potential normalization agreement that could allow Netanyahu to present himself as the Israeli leader best equipped to manage security threats and build strategic partnerships.

The opportunity, however, is complicated by a fundamental contradiction. Riyadh has said that normalization with Israel depends on a credible and clearly defined path toward the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Netanyahu’s governing coalition, including influential figures who oppose Palestinian statehood and support the expansion of Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank, has pursued policies that run directly counter to that condition.

The result is a delicate political calculation. Netanyahu appears to be looking for a way to use security cooperation—particularly in response to threats linked to Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement—as a channel toward broader diplomatic engagement with Saudi Arabia. Yet any formal agreement would require him to balance Saudi demands, possible American involvement and the positions of his domestic coalition.

## An election under pressure

The coming election is the first Israeli parliamentary vote since the Gaza war began on 7 October 2023 and the regional developments that followed. According to the evidence cited in the source report, Netanyahu’s political standing has weakened after years in which he presented himself as the central figure in Israeli politics.

Recent polling averages reportedly place the Yashar party, led by former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, significantly ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud. The reported advantage does not necessarily mean that the opposition will win or that it can form a coherent governing coalition. Nevertheless, it indicates that Netanyahu is entering the campaign under pressure.

In that environment, foreign policy can serve as a means of reshaping a leader’s electoral image. Netanyahu has long sought to portray himself as uniquely capable of confronting security threats and establishing relationships with regional and global powers. A normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, particularly if announced before the election, could therefore become a major political achievement.

Netanyahu could frame such an agreement as the result of his diplomatic strategy and as evidence that Israel had gained a stronger regional position under his leadership. Reports cited by the source indicate that he understands the potential electoral value of such a breakthrough and is attempting to secure it.

## Riyadh as the central prize

Saudi Arabia has held a distinct position in Israel’s normalization calculations since the Abraham Accords of 2020. While the accords opened a new phase in Israel’s relations with several Arab states, Saudi Arabia was viewed as a far more consequential potential partner because of its political, economic and religious standing in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

A Saudi decision to establish formal relations with Israel could expand the significance of the normalization process well beyond the agreements reached with other Arab countries. It could also reshape regional alignments and provide Netanyahu with a diplomatic achievement of far greater weight.

Reports of Israeli efforts to approach Riyadh date back to 2020. In November of that year, reports emerged of a meeting between Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Saudi city of Neom. The meeting was not officially confirmed. The episode nevertheless reflected the strategic importance both sides attached to the possibility of a future relationship.

The current effort, as described in the source material, is therefore not the beginning of an entirely new process. Rather, it is an attempt to convert existing security channels and contacts into a formal diplomatic outcome.

Ben Caspit, an Israeli journalist writing for Al-Monitor, reported—citing two senior Israeli political sources—that Netanyahu was continuing confidential, last-minute efforts to advance normalization with Riyadh. According to those sources, he hoped to take advantage of security pressure on Saudi Arabia resulting from developments in Yemen and its confrontation with Ansar Allah.

The reported calculation is that Israeli assistance in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance or even military advice could create a channel for political discussions and, eventually, normalization. The idea would be to present Israel as a dependable security partner at a moment when Saudi Arabia is seeking ways to address regional threats.

## Yemen and the security channel

The conflict involving Ansar Allah has introduced a new variable into the Israeli-Saudi equation. According to the Al-Monitor report, Israel has conveyed messages to Saudi officials expressing readiness to provide intelligence and military advice related to confronting the movement.

Axios separately reported on 15 September, citing two Israeli officials, that Israel and Saudi Arabia had discussed possible Israeli intelligence assistance against Ansar Allah, with mediation by the United States Central Command, or CENTCOM. One option under discussion reportedly involved cooperation in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance—an arrangement said to resemble an earlier model of Israeli-Emirati security cooperation.

The source material also cites an Axios report that senior military commanders from the United States, Israel and seven Arab countries—including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt—attended a confidential meeting in Germany. The meeting was organized by the commander of CENTCOM, and the command confirmed that it had taken place.

These developments suggest that possible Israeli-Saudi normalization cannot be examined solely as a bilateral issue. Israeli efforts to move closer to Riyadh are unfolding alongside discussions about a broader regional security structure, the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb waterway and the shared concerns of several Arab governments over the expansion of regional tensions.

Haaretz also reported that, during a security cabinet meeting, Israeli military officials stressed the need to focus on diplomatic efforts to build an international and regional coalition against Ansar Allah.

Still, security cooperation does not automatically translate into diplomatic normalization. Even the Al-Monitor report cited in the evidence emphasizes that Israeli intelligence assistance alone would not guarantee progress toward an agreement with Saudi Arabia. Cooperation may create contacts and mutual incentives, but it does not remove the political conditions Riyadh has attached to normalization.

## The Palestinian condition

The principal obstacle remains the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia has stated that it will not normalize relations with Israel without a credible and clear path toward the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry’s stated position, as cited in the source material, is that diplomatic relations with Israel will not be established without recognition of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital. The report says that this position was reiterated in 2026.

That condition conflicts with the policies of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition. Bezalel Smotrich, Israel’s finance minister and leader of the Religious Zionism party, is a prominent opponent of Palestinian statehood. During the current Knesset term, he has supported the expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank with Netanyahu’s backing.

Reuters reported that Israel allocated substantial funding in July for the development of 34 new settlements. Smotrich described the move as an effort to strengthen Israeli control over the West Bank.

A more recent development cited in the source material was Israel’s announcement of a tender for 2,167 additional housing units in the E1 settlement project. The project’s total number of planned units would rise to 3,401. Reuters reported that Smotrich supported the plan and described it as an action intended to prevent the creation of an independent Palestinian state.

The timing of the tender was also notable: the deadline was set for 25 October, two days before the election.

These policies deepen Netanyahu’s political dilemma. A deal with Saudi Arabia could provide a major foreign-policy achievement and potentially strengthen his campaign. But meeting Riyadh’s stated condition would require the Israeli government to support a credible political process leading toward Palestinian statehood—an approach that could alienate key members of Netanyahu’s coalition and weaken his support among the right-wing electorate.

## The limits of the ‘Saudi card’

Netanyahu’s challenge is therefore not simply to open a security channel with Riyadh. It is to determine whether that channel can be transformed into a formal diplomatic agreement without fracturing the coalition on which his government depends.

The Yemen file may offer him a way to begin that process indirectly. By emphasizing intelligence-sharing, surveillance and regional defense, Israel can seek to establish practical cooperation without immediately resolving the most contentious political questions. Washington’s role could also provide a framework for connecting security arrangements with wider diplomatic discussions.

Yet such an approach has clear limits. Saudi Arabia’s position on the Palestinian issue is not merely a procedural demand that can be bypassed through security cooperation. It is a central condition for normalization. Any attempt to separate the two tracks could therefore produce contacts and coordination without leading to formal diplomatic relations.

For Netanyahu, the distinction matters electorally. Even an announcement of expanded security discussions with Saudi Arabia could be presented as evidence of diplomatic momentum. But a formal normalization agreement would carry far greater political value—and would also require concessions that his coalition partners may reject.

The regional environment adds further uncertainty. The source material reports that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman contacted Donald Trump to seek American action against Ansar Allah, while Washington was not, at that stage, inclined to open a new front or intervene directly in a war against the movement. That reluctance could limit the extent to which the Yemen crisis becomes the foundation for a larger security arrangement.

As the 27 October election approaches, Netanyahu is thus trying to turn the “Saudi card” into an electoral advantage while navigating competing pressures. He needs a foreign-policy achievement that can reinforce his image as a security-minded leader, but he must also preserve the support of coalition partners opposed to Palestinian statehood.

The result is a strategy built around an unresolved contradiction: Israel may be able to deepen security contacts with Saudi Arabia over Yemen, but moving from those contacts to normalization will depend on Riyadh’s demands regarding Palestine. For Netanyahu, the “Yemen card” may provide diplomatic leverage and campaign material. Whether it can become a formal breakthrough before the election remains uncertain.