Netanyahu Seeks to Turn Saudi Normalization Bid into an Election Advantage

TEHRAN — As Israel approaches its October 27, 2026 Knesset election, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is reportedly seeking to use developments in Yemen to strengthen cooperation with Saudi Arabia and revive negotiations on normalization. The effort could provide Netanyahu with a significant foreign-policy achievement, but the Palestinian issue remains the main political barrier.

The election will be the first parliamentary vote in Israel since the Gaza war began on October 7, 2023, and amid the broader regional developments that followed. According to the latest published polling averages cited by IRNA, the Yashar party, led by former military chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, has moved well ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud party. The lead does not necessarily indicate an opposition victory or a clearly defined governing coalition, but it has increased pressure on the prime minister.

Against this backdrop, foreign policy could help Netanyahu reshape his electoral image. He has long presented himself as the Israeli politician best equipped to manage security threats and build strategic relationships with regional and global powers. A normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia, particularly if reached before the election, could be portrayed as a direct result of his diplomacy.

According to a recent report by Israeli journalist Ben Caspit in Al-Monitor, Netanyahu is continuing what senior Israeli political sources described as last-minute, confidential efforts to advance normalization with Riyadh. The report says he hopes to take advantage of the security pressure Saudi Arabia is facing as a result of developments in Yemen and its confrontation with Ansar Allah.

The reported Israeli calculation is that assistance to Saudi Arabia in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance or military advice could create a channel for broader political discussions and eventually normalization. The effort would build on earlier attempts to bring Israel and Saudi Arabia closer, including reports of an unconfirmed meeting between Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Neom in November 2020, during Donald Trump’s first presidency.

Saudi Arabia, however, has consistently linked normalization to the Palestinian issue. Riyadh has said it will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without recognition of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and a credible path toward its creation. The Saudi Foreign Ministry repeated this position in 2026.

That condition conflicts with the position of Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition partners. Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, leader of the Religious Zionism party, opposes the creation of a Palestinian state and has supported settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank. Reuters has reported that Israel allocated substantial funds in July for the development of 34 new settlements, a move Smotrich described as strengthening Israeli control over the West Bank.

Israel has also announced a tender for 2,167 additional housing units in the E1 settlement plan, bringing the total number of planned units there to 3,401, according to the evidence cited by IRNA. Reuters reported that Smotrich supported the plan and described it as a measure to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. The tender deadline was set for October 25, two days before the election.

This leaves Netanyahu facing a political contradiction. An agreement with Saudi Arabia could strengthen his foreign-policy credentials, while meeting Riyadh’s main condition would challenge the positions of his coalition partners and could cost him support within his governing bloc. His electoral challenge is therefore to balance Saudi demands, US considerations and the red lines of his domestic allies.

The Yemen conflict has introduced a new element into this calculation. Caspit’s report says Netanyahu is seeking to present Israel as a reliable security partner for Riyadh at a time when Saudi Arabia is under pressure from Ansar Allah. Israeli sources cited by the report said that Israel had conveyed its willingness to provide intelligence and military advice to Saudi Arabia and had sought to use Washington to connect security cooperation with progress toward normalization.

Axios reported on September 15, citing two Israeli officials, that Israel and Saudi Arabia were holding talks mediated by the US Central Command on possible Israeli intelligence assistance to Riyadh against Ansar Allah. One option under discussion reportedly involved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance cooperation, following a model said to have been used previously in cooperation between Israel and the United Arab Emirates.

Axios also reported that senior military commanders from the United States, Israel and seven Arab countries — Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan and Egypt — attended a confidential meeting in Germany. The meeting was organized by the commander of US Central Command, which confirmed that it had taken place.

These developments suggest that any potential normalization process cannot be viewed solely through the lens of bilateral Israeli-Saudi relations. Israel’s efforts to deepen ties with Riyadh are unfolding alongside discussions about a new regional security architecture, the strategic importance of the Bab el-Mandeb strait and shared concerns among some Arab governments about the expansion of regional tensions.

Haaretz has also reported that Israeli military officials told a security cabinet meeting that diplomatic efforts should focus on forming an international and regional coalition against Ansar Allah. Yet security cooperation does not necessarily mean that Saudi Arabia is prepared to normalize relations with Israel. Even Caspit’s report acknowledged that Israeli intelligence assistance alone would not guarantee progress toward normalization.

The reported pressure on Saudi Arabia has also prompted Riyadh to seek possible US action against Ansar Allah, although Washington has reportedly shown reluctance to open a new front or intervene directly in the conflict. For Netanyahu, however, any progress with Saudi Arabia before October 27 could still have electoral value. He could present such a development as evidence of his ability to build regional alliances.

The Yemen issue may therefore provide Netanyahu with a security and diplomatic lever, but moving from informal security cooperation to formal normalization will continue to depend largely on Riyadh’s position on Palestinian statehood.