War Risk Raises Tanker Insurance and Extends Oil-Shipping Routes
An energy analyst cited by Iran’s IRNA says war-risk premiums have risen tenfold and some oil shipments now take 35 days instead of 17, but the figures are not independently verified in the supplied evidence.
IRNA reports an energy analyst’s assessment that maritime-security risks around Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb have increased tanker insurance by roughly tenfold and extended some oil shipments from 17 to 35 days. The cost mechanism is plausible, but the supplied evidence does not independently verify the article’s figures, traffic statistics or price forecasts.
## Verified within the supplied source
Iran’s IRNA reports that energy analyst Ehsan Janabi attributed higher energy costs to disruptions affecting tanker traffic around the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. According to the report:
- War-risk insurance for oil tankers has increased from about 0.05% to at least 0.5% of cargo value—approximately tenfold. - Insurance for a $120 million tanker reportedly rose from about $40,000 to roughly $600,000 per voyage. - Rerouting ships around Africa has extended some oil-cargo journeys from approximately 17 days to 35 days. - The source says the longer voyages increase fuel use, delay deliveries to refineries and raise freight costs. - Janabi estimates that tanker freight costs for oil shipped from the Persian Gulf to Asia could rise from about $2 to at least $6 per barrel under sustained disruption. - He also argues that LNG is particularly exposed because, unlike much oil, it has no equivalent pipeline alternative on the affected routes.
These figures and assessments are statements attributed to Janabi in the IRNA report; the supplied material does not include independent confirmation from insurers, shipowners, maritime authorities, market data providers or the cited Reuters report.
## Analysis
The reported mechanism is economically plausible: elevated security risk increases insurance and financing costs, while route diversions increase voyage time, fuel consumption and the amount of cargo tied up at sea. Those costs can feed into delivered prices for crude oil, refined products and LNG. Longer transit times may also make refinery inventories more difficult to manage, particularly for import-dependent Asian markets.
The effect on global prices would depend on the duration and geographic scope of the disruption, the availability of alternative export routes, tanker capacity, inventory levels and whether producers or governments release strategic stocks. A temporary insurance shock would have a different impact from a prolonged physical interruption of shipping.
The report also describes possible second-order effects, including reduced willingness by shipowners to accept cargoes, tighter tanker availability and higher price volatility. These are analytical implications rather than independently established outcomes in the supplied evidence.
## Uncertainty and limitations
The source presents numerous major claims—including attacks on at least 75 vessels, a sharp decline in Strait of Hormuz traffic, a Brent floor near $95 per barrel and a possible rise in Asian LNG prices from $12 to $25 per million BTU—but the evidence provided does not independently substantiate them. The article also contains politically charged descriptions of the conflict and attributes several forecasts to a single analyst. No dates for the alleged market observations, methodology, insurance contracts or freight-rate series are supplied. Accordingly, the strongest supported conclusion is that the article reports a substantial increase in perceived maritime-risk costs and transit times, not that all cited market effects have been conclusively demonstrated.








