Netanyahu’s Electoral Dilemma as Eisenkot Seeks the 61-Seat Threshold

With 42 days remaining before the parliamentary election in the occupied territories, the contest between Benjamin Netanyahu’s bloc and the opposition led by Gadi Eisenkot remains exceptionally close. Recent polls cited by Iran’s IRNA news agency place Eisenkot’s Yashar party ahead of Netanyahu’s Likud, but they do not show the opposition with a clear, independent path to the 61 seats required to form a government.

Instead, the emerging picture is one of a fragmented parliament in which the fate of smaller parties, turnout among Arab voters and post-election coalition negotiations may matter as much as the performance of the two leading parties.

The latest polling has therefore deepened, rather than resolved, the central question of the campaign: can Eisenkot convert a lead in party standings and a strong personal position among opposition voters into a governing majority?

### A lead for Eisenkot, but no straightforward majority

A Channel 12 poll cited in the report gives Yashar, led by Eisenkot, 23 seats, making it the largest party in the Knesset, although the party is down two seats from the previous survey. Likud, led by Netanyahu, is projected to win 20 seats, one fewer than in the earlier poll.

Naftali Bennett’s B’yachad is projected to win 13 seats, while Yair Golan’s Democrats would receive 10. Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu and United Torah Judaism are each assigned eight seats. The Joint Arab List is also projected to win eight seats, while Shas is given seven.

The poll assigns five seats to the joint Religious Zionism–Zehut list led by Bezalel Smotrich. Ra’am, led by Mansour Abbas, is projected to win four seats, as is Ofr Winter’s new Amkha Yisrael party. A list associated with Yoaz Hendel and Yaron Zelicha is also projected to receive four seats.

The distribution illustrates why the largest party may not automatically be the one that forms the government. According to the figures cited in the report, parties identified with the opposition hold 54 seats among Zionist parties. With the addition of 12 Arab seats, the opposition could reach 66 seats, but such a coalition would depend on Arab parties whose participation is politically contentious and not guaranteed.

Netanyahu’s bloc is projected to hold 50 seats, while the Hendel–Zelicha list remains outside the two principal blocs with four seats. The result is a parliament in which coalition-building, rather than the ranking of individual parties, would determine the next government.

### The Amkha Israel dilemma

The future of Amkha Israel, led by Ofr Winter, has become one of the most consequential uncertainties for Netanyahu and Likud. The party emerged from Likud and presents itself as a right-centre alternative for voters who no longer wish to support Likud or parties identified with the far right, but who do not consider themselves part of the left or centre blocs.

The question is whether Amkha Israel can cross the electoral threshold. If it fails, votes from right-wing voters could go without representation in the Knesset, potentially weakening Netanyahu’s bloc. If it succeeds, however, it could take seats from parties already competing within the right-wing camp and complicate Netanyahu’s internal coalition arithmetic.

A new Channel 12 poll cited in the report projects Amkha Israel at four seats, meaning it would cross the threshold for the first time. That projection has placed Netanyahu in a difficult strategic position. He could attack Winter politically in an effort to prevent the party from entering parliament, but excessive pressure could also drive some right-wing voters toward Amkha Israel.

Figures from Likud have reportedly intensified their attacks on Winter, arguing that his party could waste votes belonging to the broader right-wing camp. Winter, for his part, says his support comes primarily from voters who define themselves as belonging to the centre-right and who are no longer prepared to back Likud or more hard-line right-wing parties.

The party’s performance could therefore have an effect beyond its own seat total. A failure to cross the threshold could strengthen the larger right-wing parties by leaving its votes unrepresented. Success could increase the number of parties required to assemble a governing coalition and reduce the room available to Likud within its own camp.

### Arab turnout as a decisive variable

The level of participation among Arab voters is another variable highlighted in the report. Arab parties collectively won 10 seats in the previous election, while current assessments cited by Maariv suggest that they could win 14 or even 15 seats if turnout increases.

Higher Arab turnout would not necessarily translate directly into support for an Eisenkot-led government. It could, however, reduce the number of seats available to Zionist parties and make it harder for the opposition to reach 61 seats without relying on Arab parties.

The Channel 12 figures cited in the report assign 12 seats to Arab parties. Even under that projection, the opposition’s path to a majority would depend on cooperation from those parties. Such cooperation could take different forms, but the report presents it as one of the major political and coalition obstacles facing Eisenkot’s camp.

The issue has also entered the campaign through Likud’s reported efforts to challenge the participation of some Arab parties. According to the Times of Israel, Likud is seeking, through the Central Elections Committee, a legal basis for preventing certain Arab parties from contesting the election. Likud has reportedly justified the request by referring to security issues and ideological disagreements.

The report characterizes the effort both as part of the electoral contest and as a possible psychological campaign aimed at placing pressure on Eisenkot. The ultimate outcome of any such effort is not established in the supplied evidence.

### A second poll shows an even tighter race

A separate Kan 11 poll presents a more evenly balanced picture. It gives both Netanyahu’s bloc and Eisenkot’s bloc 52 seats, with Arab parties holding 12 seats.

In that survey, Eisenkot’s Yashar remains the largest individual party with 24 seats, followed by Likud with 20. B’yachad is projected to win 12 seats and the Democrats eight. Yisrael Beiteinu and Jewish Power are each assigned eight seats, while United Torah Judaism and Shas receive seven apiece.

The Joint List is projected to win seven seats, Religious Zionism six and Ra’am five. Amkha Israel and the Hendel–Zelicha list are each given four seats.

Although the detailed party figures and bloc totals differ between the Channel 12 and Kan 11 surveys, both point to the same broad conclusion: Eisenkot’s party is ahead, but neither poll establishes an uncomplicated route to a government with a stable 61-seat majority.

The divergence between the surveys also underlines the uncertainty surrounding smaller parties and bloc classifications. A party entering or falling below the electoral threshold can alter the distribution of seats without a corresponding change in overall voter preferences. The composition of any coalition would then depend on which parties survive the threshold and which groups are willing to cooperate after the election.

### Eisenkot’s personal advantage—and the opposition’s internal competition

Eisenkot has also strengthened his standing as the leading figure among voters opposed to Netanyahu. According to the Channel 12 survey cited in the report, 59 percent of opposition supporters regard him as the real leader of their camp. Bennett is identified by 19 percent and Lieberman by 11 percent.

When respondents were asked who would be the most suitable candidate for prime minister after the election, Eisenkot received 53 percent, compared with 31 percent for Bennett and 13 percent for Lieberman.

Yet the same poll points to a potential weakness within the opposition. Fifty-two percent of opposition supporters said that the three-way competition among Eisenkot, Bennett and Lieberman harms their camp’s prospects of victory, while 38 percent disagreed.

The findings suggest that Eisenkot has emerged as the opposition’s strongest individual figure, but that his camp has not fully resolved how competing leaders and parties should be organized around a single governing project. Sixty-five percent of respondents said that the leading candidate for prime minister should be determined by which party wins the most representation. Only 25 percent selected political experience as the main criterion.

That preference could benefit Eisenkot if Yashar remains the largest opposition party. It does not, however, settle the broader coalition question. A party’s first-place finish would not by itself provide enough seats to form a government, and the opposition would still need to manage its internal rivalries and its relationship with Arab parties.

### Netanyahu’s narrow strategic choices

For Netanyahu, the polls show a leader who retains substantial support among right-wing and religious parties but faces multiple risks. Attacking Amkha Israel could prevent the splinter party from crossing the threshold, but could also consolidate support behind Winter. Ignoring the party could allow it to take seats from Likud or its allies.

The question of Arab parties presents a similar dilemma. Greater Arab participation may reduce the number of seats available to Zionist parties and make an opposition majority more difficult. But efforts to limit Arab participation can intensify political polarization and become another source of contention in the campaign.

Netanyahu’s bloc also faces the broader problem of fragmentation. Even if its combined total remains competitive, the final coalition could depend on parties that are close to the threshold or on independent lists positioned outside the two main camps.

Eisenkot’s challenge is the mirror image. He must turn Yashar’s leading position into a coalition capable of reaching 61 seats. That requires managing the competition with Bennett and Lieberman, maintaining support across the opposition and determining whether—and under what conditions—Arab parties could support a government led by his camp.

### More than a contest between two leaders

The election is therefore not simply a direct contest between Eisenkot and Netanyahu. It is also a contest over the allocation of marginal votes, the survival of small parties, Arab voter participation and the coalition negotiations that will follow the vote.

The available polling suggests that Eisenkot currently has the advantage in both party size and personal support among opposition voters. But the polls also show why that advantage may not be sufficient. The opposition’s path to power remains dependent on parties beyond Yashar, on the performance of lists such as Amkha Israel and the Hendel–Zelicha bloc, and potentially on cooperation from Arab parties.

Netanyahu, meanwhile, must protect the cohesion of his right-wing camp without unintentionally strengthening a rival on its centre-right flank. His choices regarding Winter and Arab participation could influence not only the number of seats won by individual parties but also the coalition possibilities available after election day.

With the vote still weeks away, both camps remain within reach of a governing majority, but neither has secured it. Eisenkot may be the current polling leader, yet crossing the 61-seat threshold will require more than winning the largest party label. It will require a coalition strategy capable of overcoming the opposition’s internal divisions and the electoral arithmetic that continues to keep the outcome uncertain.