Negotiating with an Enemy: Solution or Cost?

## A debate over means, not necessarily ends

A recent episode of IRNA’s program “Talāghi” brought together Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian diplomat and ambassador to Britain, and Foad Izadi, an academic researcher known for his opposition to negotiations with the United States, to debate a central strategic question: can negotiation with an adversary serve Iran’s interests, or does it create unacceptable risks?

The discussion was described by IRNA as a respectful exchange between two differing perspectives. Although the participants disagreed over the value and timing of negotiations, they shared an emphasis on Iran’s strength and on the importance of protecting the country’s interests. They also stressed that they had not come to quarrel, but to identify areas of agreement.

At the heart of Baharvand’s position is the distinction between an objective and a method. The question, as he frames it, should not simply be whether Iran wants negotiation or war. Iran, he argues, wants victory—and negotiation is only one instrument that may be used when circumstances make it appropriate.

This view treats diplomacy as a tool rather than as an end in itself. Negotiations would therefore neither automatically represent compromise nor guarantee success. Their value would depend on the broader balance of power, the conditions under which they were conducted, and the goals Iran sought to achieve.

## The argument against continued talks

Izadi’s position is considerably more skeptical. According to the account of the discussion, he argues that the use of negotiations has so far produced no result. He further warns that, if talks continue, the United States could attack Iran’s infrastructure and use a nuclear bomb.

These predictions form the most severe point of disagreement between the two speakers. Baharvand characterizes such forecasts as “self-fulfilling” in nature. In his view, presenting the worst possible outcome as an inevitable consequence of negotiation may itself shape political behavior and narrow the space for other options.

The available account does not provide a detailed transcript of the exchange or evidence establishing the likelihood of the scenarios raised by Izadi. It records them as his warnings within the debate. That distinction matters: the discussion presents competing assessments of risk, not a confirmed prediction of future events.

## Strength and diplomatic opportunity

Both participants, however, appear to share an assessment of Iran’s position after recent wars. IRNA reports that they believe the United States has increasingly recognized Iran as a difficult opponent—“a hard wall” and not an easy target.

From that shared premise, Baharvand draws a diplomatic conclusion. He argues that Iran’s defensive power has created opportunities for diplomacy. In this reading, military and defensive capabilities do not replace diplomacy; they can provide the conditions in which diplomatic instruments become more effective. Negotiation may also be used to manage tensions while Iran continues to pursue its broader interests.

Izadi rejects that interpretation of the current situation. He argues that no such opportunity existed, or would exist, because the Strait of Hormuz had not been completely closed in a way that would force a change in American behavior. His position therefore places greater emphasis on coercive pressure and on actions intended to alter the other side’s calculations.

The disagreement is consequently not only about whether to negotiate. It is also about what creates leverage. Baharvand emphasizes the possible interaction between defensive strength and diplomatic openings. Izadi argues that diplomacy without a more decisive pressure mechanism cannot produce the desired change.

## A strategic choice under uncertainty

The exchange illustrates two contrasting approaches to national strategy. One sees negotiation as a conditional instrument: neither inherently beneficial nor inherently harmful, but potentially useful when aligned with a clear objective and supported by adequate national power. The other sees negotiations with Washington, particularly under the Trump administration, as a process that has failed to deliver results and may expose Iran to greater danger.

Neither position, as presented in the supplied account, resolves the question conclusively. Baharvand’s argument leaves open the difficult issue of when diplomacy becomes useful and how its success should be measured. Izadi’s argument highlights the costs of relying on talks, but rests in part on highly consequential forecasts whose likelihood is not established in the account.

What the discussion does make clear is that the choice is not simply between war and negotiation. The speakers place the issue within a wider contest involving national strength, deterrence, pressure, risk assessment and the timing of diplomatic action. Their shared insistence on Iran’s interests provides common ground, even as they disagree over the instruments most likely to protect them.

IRNA presents the conversation as a notable and direct encounter between a veteran diplomat and a prominent critic of negotiations with the United States. Its significance lies less in a final resolution than in the clarity of the strategic divide: whether talks should be retained as one option among several, or rejected because the risks and past results are judged to outweigh their potential benefits.