Iran’s Path Toward Active Deterrence

## A shift from defense to active deterrence

A report by Iran’s state-run Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) presents a series of recent military actions as evidence that Iran’s armed forces are moving beyond a primarily defensive posture toward what it calls “active deterrence.” In this framing, the objective is not only to repel an attack or preserve existing positions, but also to convince potential adversaries that any military action against Iran would prompt a rapid, reciprocal and costly response.

The report points to the destruction of unmanned surface vessels, the reported capture of an advanced autonomous underwater system and missile strikes against military vessels and bases as examples of this approach. Together, it argues, these incidents send a message that the cost of attacking Iran must be included in an adversary’s calculations before any operation begins.

The article attributes this position to a broader evolution in Iran’s military doctrine. Instead of relying solely on territorial defense, missile power and naval capabilities, the report emphasizes intelligence collection, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, precision, integrated air defense and the speed of decision-making.

## The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic setting

Several of the incidents described by IRNA took place near the Strait of Hormuz, one of the most strategically important waterways in the region. The strait’s geographic position, its role in maritime commerce and its importance to global energy flows make it a sensitive arena for military signaling and confrontation.

According to the report, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy struck an unmanned vessel at the entrance to the strait on Thursday, September 19. The vessel was identified as an enemy “Shampad,” bearing hull number 5838 and belonging to the “Sea Drone” type. IRNA said the operation prevented the vessel from completing its mission.

The report presents the incident as significant because unmanned platforms are increasingly used for surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence collection and, in some cases, combat operations. Their use can reduce the need to place personnel directly in harm’s way while allowing military forces to monitor or operate in contested areas.

IRNA also reported that the Revolutionary Guard Navy captured an autonomous underwater system belonging to the United States near the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz on the evening of September 17. The report said the system was taken intact during an operation based on what it described as intelligence and operational superiority.

## The reported capture of an autonomous underwater vehicle

The system was identified in the report as the “Dive LD,” manufactured by the American company Anduril Industries. IRNA described it as one of the first examples of the platform delivered in 2025 to the U.S. Navy’s unmanned underwater systems units.

According to the specifications cited by the report, the system is approximately 5.8 meters long and weighs nearly three tonnes. It is designed to conduct extended autonomous missions in deep water, with a reported endurance of up to 10 days and an ability to reach depths of 6,000 meters. The report also described the system as modular, with sections produced using three-dimensional printing technology to enable the rapid installation of different sensors and mission payloads.

IRNA listed a range of possible missions for the platform, including underwater surveillance, seabed mapping, mine detection, inspection of maritime cables and pipelines, anti-submarine warfare support and the transmission of information. It described the combination of autonomy, endurance and mission flexibility as the system’s principal strengths.

The report argues that acquiring such a system could have two consequences for Iran. First, it could demonstrate the ability of Iranian forces to detect, track and counter sophisticated equipment. That, in turn, could affect an adversary’s operational calculations. Second, access to an intact platform could provide an opportunity to study its technology, structure and operating methods, potentially improving Iran’s ability to respond to similar systems in the future.

These conclusions are presented by IRNA as part of its broader argument about the growing importance of intelligence and electronic warfare. The report does not independently establish the technical performance of the system or provide external confirmation of the capture. Its account should therefore be understood as an Iranian state-media description of the incident and its strategic significance.

## Unmanned systems and the information contest

The encounters described in the report illustrate how unmanned surface, aerial and underwater systems are changing military competition. Such platforms can perform missions over long periods, gather information and operate in environments where deploying crewed systems may be more costly or dangerous.

Their increasing use also raises the importance of the systems designed to find, identify, disrupt and defeat them. IRNA argues that missiles and conventional combat equipment alone are no longer sufficient. A modern force must also be able to detect targets, identify them accurately, interfere with communications and navigation, deceive opposing systems and transmit information quickly across a network.

From this perspective, the contest is not limited to the destruction of a platform. It also involves the ability to establish awareness of the battlespace before an adversary can act, maintain communications under pressure and make decisions quickly enough to exploit fleeting opportunities.

The report characterizes the confrontation with unmanned vessels and autonomous underwater systems as a test of Iran’s intelligence, electronic and operational capabilities. It places particular emphasis on what it calls “intelligence superiority,” presenting the discovery and interception of advanced systems as evidence that the outcome of future conflicts may depend as much on information management as on firepower.

## Technology and the changing character of war

The report describes modern warfare as increasingly shaped by technological competition. It argues that conflicts are no longer based exclusively on traditional military formations and direct deployments. Long-range missiles, drones, autonomous systems and precision weapons allow states to strike targets at considerable distances without necessarily sending large numbers of personnel into enemy territory.

This development has encouraged countries to invest in the development or acquisition of next-generation weapons and military systems. In the analysis offered by IRNA, the battlefield is becoming an arena in which the ability to detect and counter advanced equipment is itself a component of national military power.

For Iran, the report says, maintaining and improving defensive capabilities requires continued development in autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, reconnaissance and surveillance. It also highlights the role of newer air-defense systems and more precise optical and electro-optical equipment in engagements involving aerial and maritime targets.

The report does not provide a detailed inventory of Iran’s capabilities or independently assess the performance of its systems. Instead, it presents a strategic argument: that sustained investment in technology is necessary if Iran is to influence the calculations of stronger or technologically advanced opponents.

## Rapid response as a deterrent signal

The central claim of the article is that the speed and decisiveness of a response can be as important as the damage inflicted on a target. A rapid counteraction is intended to demonstrate that an attack will not be absorbed without consequence and that an adversary cannot assume it will control the pace or location of escalation.

In this logic, deterrence depends partly on creating uncertainty before an attack takes place. A potential adversary must consider not only whether an operation is technically possible, but also how quickly Iran could respond, what assets it could target and how much risk the operation would create for personnel and military infrastructure.

The IRNA report cites Iranian missile strikes against military vessels, air-defense-equipped ships and military bases as examples of this approach. It says targets included military facilities, maintenance and repair hangars, preparation and deployment areas, and shelters for F-35, F-16 and F-15 fighter aircraft. The account attributes these actions to Iran’s armed forces and describes them as responses to attacks on Iranian tankers and areas in the country’s south.

The report also said that on September 23 the Revolutionary Guard announced the interception and destruction of an advanced MQ-1 drone over the Strait of Hormuz. According to the announcement quoted by IRNA, the drone was engaged by a new advanced air-defense system operated within the country’s integrated air-defense network.

These claims are presented in the source as evidence of a coordinated response architecture involving the army, the Revolutionary Guard, air defense and intelligence networks. The supplied material does not include independent verification of the reported strikes, the identities of all targets or the stated damage.

## From passive defense to active deterrence

The concept of active deterrence described in the report combines several elements: the ability to protect national territory, the ability to retaliate against an attacker and the ability to impose costs quickly enough to influence future behavior.

Under this approach, naval operations near the Strait of Hormuz are not merely defensive patrols. They are also intended to demonstrate that Iran can monitor and challenge foreign military activity in a strategically important area. The destruction or capture of unmanned systems is portrayed as a way to show that advanced technology does not guarantee freedom of action for an opposing force.

The reported capture of the autonomous underwater vehicle carries particular symbolic importance in this narrative. An underwater platform can be difficult to detect, and its missions may include surveillance of the seabed, cables, pipelines and naval routes. If the report’s account is accurate, locating and taking such a system would indicate a capacity to combine maritime awareness, tracking and operational intervention. However, the evidence supplied here consists of the Iranian report and does not establish the incident independently.

The same principle applies to aerial systems. The report’s description of the MQ-1 interception frames the event as a demonstration that Iran’s air-defense network can respond to advanced unmanned aircraft. In the broader argument, the ability to detect and defeat drones reduces the freedom of action that adversaries might otherwise expect to have at a lower human cost than direct engagement with crewed aircraft.

## The limits and requirements of deterrence

The report ultimately portrays deterrence as a continuing process rather than a single demonstration of force. Destroying an unmanned vessel, capturing an underwater platform or striking a military facility may influence an adversary’s calculations, but durable deterrence requires capabilities that can be sustained over time.

Those capabilities include reliable intelligence, updated equipment, resilient communications, electronic-warfare capacity, accurate targeting and disciplined decision-making. They also require the ability to integrate information from different services and respond without creating unnecessary escalation or exposing forces to avoidable risks.

The emphasis on integration is important. A missile, drone or air-defense system does not operate in isolation. Its effectiveness depends on the quality of the information used to identify a target, the speed with which that information reaches decision-makers and the ability of operators to act under contested conditions.

In this sense, active deterrence is not simply a matter of possessing more weapons. It is also a matter of connecting surveillance, communications, electronic warfare, command systems and precision strike capabilities into a coherent operational structure.

## A technology-driven strategic competition

The events described by IRNA reflect a wider transformation in military competition. Unmanned systems are becoming more common in the air, at sea and below the surface. Autonomous platforms can remain deployed for extended periods, perform specialized missions and gather information without exposing a crewed vehicle to the same level of risk.

At the same time, their presence creates new vulnerabilities. They depend on sensors, navigation, communications, software and data links. Forces that can interfere with those systems, deceive them or exploit their operating patterns may be able to neutralize a technologically advanced platform without relying solely on conventional firepower.

This is why the report places electronic warfare and information superiority alongside missiles and naval power. It argues that future conflicts will be decided by a combination of precision, autonomy, intelligence, cyber and electronic capabilities, and the speed at which commanders can translate information into action.

For Iran, the report presents this competition as a reason to expand investment in artificial intelligence, autonomous platforms, surveillance, electronic warfare and modern air defense. It also links technological development to national security, arguing that the ability to impose costs on an attacker can help prevent a conflict from beginning in the first place.

## Conclusion

The IRNA report describes Iran as moving toward a model of active deterrence in which defense is paired with rapid retaliation and the ability to disrupt an adversary’s operations. The reported destruction of an unmanned surface vessel near the Strait of Hormuz, the reported capture of an autonomous underwater system and the claimed interception of an MQ-1 drone are presented as examples of this shift.

The article’s broader message is that military power is no longer measured only by territorial defenses, missile inventories or naval forces. Intelligence collection, electronic warfare, unmanned systems, precision, integrated networks and rapid decision-making are increasingly central to the ability to deter an opponent.

The supplied evidence supports the conclusion that Iran’s official military narrative is placing greater emphasis on these capabilities and on the idea that any attack should generate an immediate and costly response. It does not, however, independently verify the operational claims, technical specifications or battlefield results described in the source.

Whether this approach produces lasting deterrence will depend on more than individual operations. It will depend on the reliability of Iran’s intelligence and command networks, the resilience of its equipment, the sustainability of its defense programs and the ability of its armed forces to manage escalation. In the strategic environment surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, the interaction of these factors will shape how Iran, the United States and other regional actors assess risk in future confrontations.