Iran Debate Exposes Sharp Divide Over Deterrence, Diplomacy and the Strait of Hormuz

A televised debate between former Iranian diplomat Mohsen Baharvand and foreign-policy academic Fouad Izadi has highlighted a fundamental disagreement in Tehran over how to respond to pressure from the United States: whether Iran should prioritize diplomacy and controlled de-escalation, or adopt a more confrontational strategy designed to impose significant costs on Washington and its regional partners.

The discussion, reported by Iran’s IRNA news agency, focused heavily on the Strait of Hormuz, the future of negotiations with the United States, Iran’s military vulnerability, and the risks of allowing the current confrontation to continue without a change in strategy.

Baharvand argued that diplomacy remains essential even when military readiness is maintained. In his view, Iran’s resistance has already persuaded the United States that a purely military solution may not achieve its objectives. That, he said, creates an opening for limited or temporary agreements that could help control the conflict.

Izadi took a more skeptical position. He said negotiations alone had failed to change American behavior and argued that Iran should use a wider range of political, economic, intelligence and other tools to increase the cost of Washington’s policies. He presented the possibility of restricting oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz as one way to exert economic pressure.

The exchange was not a discussion between two sides that rejected diplomacy altogether. Both participants said diplomatic channels should remain available. Their disagreement concerned the conditions under which diplomacy could work, and whether negotiations should be the central instrument of policy or one tool among several.

### Baharvand: Escalation could hurt Iran more

Baharvand’s central warning was that an increase in tension would not necessarily persuade the United States to retreat. Instead, he said, Washington might respond by escalating even further.

“Possible it may increase two steps more,” Baharvand said, according to the report. He argued that the United States could absorb the consequences of escalation more easily because its territory and major interests were not directly exposed to the same degree as Iran’s. The disparity in military technology and economic capacity, he said, gives Washington greater room to intensify a confrontation.

Baharvand also challenged the assumption that raising the stakes automatically produces a favorable outcome for the side that initiates the escalation. Iran, he said, must preserve its ability to respond to an existential threat, but it should avoid giving the United States a justification for repeated attacks on Iranian infrastructure.

His position was not that Iran should accept attacks or normalize them. Rather, he argued that military preparedness and diplomatic engagement should operate together. Iran could signal that a further attack would provoke a serious response while still leaving the other side an avenue for negotiation.

Baharvand said the current situation differed from earlier periods because the United States had now tested military action against Iran. In his assessment, the experience had produced a relative recognition in Washington and elsewhere that Iran was not an easy target. He cited conversations he said he had held in China, where people had expressed surprise at Iran’s ability to resist American pressure. The source did not independently verify those conversations.

He also pointed to what he described as changes in the objectives and behavior of U.S. President Donald Trump. According to Baharvand, the reduction or suspension of attacks and the pursuit of an arrangement involving the lifting of a maritime blockade indicated that military force had not delivered all of Washington’s intended results.

For Baharvand, that did not mean the United States had abandoned its broader policy. It meant only that the limits of military action had become clearer. He said Iran should use that limited opening to test whether a temporary or partial agreement could reduce the immediate danger.

### Izadi: Negotiations have not changed U.S. behavior

Izadi rejected the idea that negotiations by themselves could alter Washington’s conduct. He said Iran had engaged in diplomacy with the United States for more than two decades, yet American policy had not improved and, in some respects, had become more aggressive.

He described total military defeat of the United States as impractical, but also argued that relying solely on negotiations had not produced the desired result. His proposed alternative was what he called a third option: changing American behavior by increasing the cost of its current policy.

Izadi stressed that this did not necessarily mean immediate military action. He said states possess a broad range of instruments, including political, economic, intelligence and informational tools. In his view, Tehran should not suspend diplomacy, but neither should it treat negotiations as a privileged or sacred instrument that overrides all others.

He argued that Washington would reconsider its strategy only if the consequences became sufficiently serious. The Strait of Hormuz, through which a substantial share of global oil shipments passes, was central to his argument. Izadi said that even a temporary disruption could create significant economic pressure, particularly if it contributed to higher oil prices.

The report attributes to Izadi the argument that Iran should ensure not only that its own oil becomes inaccessible, but that regional oil supplies could also be affected. He said such a prospect might force the United States to reassess its policy. These were Izadi’s strategic claims in the debate; the report did not provide independent analysis of their feasibility or likely consequences.

Izadi also argued that Iran should reconsider what he described as an overly defensive posture. He said a country of nearly 90 million people could not accept being attacked repeatedly while responding only by defending its own territory. He called for an internal consensus on a more assertive response, while stating that the objective should be to change American behavior rather than simply increase violence.

### The dispute over the Strait of Hormuz

The Strait of Hormuz became the clearest symbol of the disagreement between the two speakers.

Izadi presented closure or effective restriction of the waterway as a means of applying pressure. He argued that Iran could withstand a limited period of reduced oil revenue, particularly if it had already sold oil at elevated prices and retained the proceeds. He also referred to alternative arrangements involving neighboring countries, although the report did not detail how such arrangements would function.

Baharvand accepted that Iran could create serious consequences by restricting the strait, but warned that doing so could allow Washington to portray the disruption as an American victory or use it as a pretext for a broader attack. He said the imbalance in military capabilities meant that the United States could respond more forcefully than Iran.

The two men also differed over how to interpret a potential American response. Izadi argued that the risk of attacks on Iranian infrastructure already existed and that failing to impose costs could encourage Washington to continue gradually weakening Iran’s capabilities. Baharvand replied that a deliberate escalation could make that risk more immediate and more severe.

Their disagreement was therefore not simply over whether Iran had the ability to disrupt shipping. It was over the political and military consequences of using that ability. Izadi treated the threat as a way to reshape Washington’s calculations. Baharvand treated it as a move that could narrow Iran’s options and expose it to retaliation.

### Arguments over a possible nuclear escalation

The debate also included stark warnings about the possibility of further escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons. Izadi said that if U.S. policy did not change, Trump might eventually consider using a nuclear weapon against Iran. The report presents this as Izadi’s warning and does not establish that such a plan exists or that preparations for such an action have been identified.

Baharvand criticized what he regarded as the predictive nature of Izadi’s argument. He said that predicting an attack in advance could become politically self-validating: if an attack occurred, the prediction would be cited as proof; if it did not, the prediction could simply be postponed.

He specifically objected to presenting an aggressive Iranian policy as the solution to the risk of attack. In his view, the possibility of an American strike existed whether Iran escalated or not, but escalation could increase the likelihood and scale of the damage.

The exchange reflected a wider problem in strategic decision-making: policymakers must prepare for worst-case scenarios without treating them as inevitable. Izadi emphasized the danger of allowing an adversary to believe that Iran would continue absorbing attacks without changing its response. Baharvand emphasized the danger of taking steps that could trigger a response Iran would be less able to withstand.

### A disagreement over what recent diplomacy means

A major point of contention was the interpretation of a reported understanding reached in Islamabad. Baharvand said the arrangement demonstrated that negotiations could produce concrete results, pointing to the claim that the United States had agreed to lift a maritime blockade more quickly than initially expected.

He argued that such an outcome could not be explained simply by saying that Trump had changed his personality or abandoned his broader goals. Instead, Baharvand said, military resistance had convinced Washington that force alone might not achieve its aims. The resulting change in behavior, even if temporary, was evidence that pressure and diplomacy could work together.

Izadi viewed the same process more critically. He said the agreement had resolved part of Washington’s problem and questioned whether that served Iran’s interests. In his assessment, Iran should not provide relief to the United States without securing a broader change in American policy.

The debate also touched on the role of Iran’s foreign minister and the Supreme National Security Council. Izadi argued that the foreign minister’s professional expertise in foreign policy made his public statements particularly significant. He interpreted references to military victory and negotiations as reflecting the political difficulty of openly presenting diplomacy as necessary in the aftermath of recent events.

Both speakers acknowledged that the Supreme National Security Council must weigh military, domestic and foreign-policy considerations together. Their disagreement was over what the council should prioritize: using pressure to force a strategic change, or using military strength to preserve negotiating space.

### The lessons of Gaza and Hezbollah

Izadi cited the war in Gaza and the experience of Hezbollah as examples of what he described as the dangers of relying on diplomacy without maintaining or increasing pressure. He argued that negotiations conducted during the Gaza conflict had helped manage Hezbollah’s involvement and allowed Israel’s opponents’ capabilities to decline over time.

He said Washington’s broader objective was to reduce Iran’s capabilities gradually over several years until Tehran could no longer respond effectively. The report attributes this strategic assessment to Izadi; it does not offer independent evidence of such a U.S. plan.

Baharvand did not deny that Iran’s capabilities could be weakened, but he drew a different conclusion. In his view, that possibility made it more important to preserve diplomatic channels and avoid moves that could accelerate attacks on Iran’s economic and civilian infrastructure.

The reference to infrastructure was significant. Both men recognized that oil facilities, desalination plants and other economic assets could be vulnerable in a prolonged confrontation. Izadi argued that Iran needed to make clear that attacks on its infrastructure would carry consequences. Baharvand warned that Iran’s own infrastructure could be damaged more severely because of the technological and geographic imbalance between the two sides.

### The strategic choice facing Iran

The debate ultimately revolved around competing theories of deterrence.

Izadi’s theory was that restraint without a credible increase in costs could be interpreted as weakness. If Washington believed Iran would continue to negotiate after attacks, blockades or the killing of senior figures, he argued, American pressure would continue and perhaps intensify. From this perspective, Iran needed to demonstrate that the current policy was unsustainable for the United States.

Baharvand’s theory was that deterrence must account for the relative ability of each side to absorb and escalate pressure. If Iran used a high-risk measure such as closing the Strait of Hormuz, Washington might respond in ways that caused greater damage to Iran. Deterrence, in this view, requires not only the ability to impose costs but also the ability to withstand the opponent’s response.

Both arguments contained an important qualification. Izadi said diplomacy should not be abandoned, but used at the appropriate time and alongside other instruments. Baharvand said Iran should maintain an assertive posture and military readiness while allowing diplomats to explore temporary agreements.

The disagreement was therefore over sequencing and emphasis. Izadi wanted Iran to alter the strategic environment before relying on diplomacy. Baharvand wanted diplomacy to remain available precisely because escalation could close off Iran’s options.

### No clear resolution

The debate ended without resolving whether Iran’s current policy should change through stronger pressure, renewed negotiations or a combination of both. Izadi maintained that two decades of diplomacy had failed to change American behavior and that another instrument was necessary. Baharvand responded that Iran had already demonstrated enough resilience to create a limited opening, and that closing the diplomatic channel could expose the country to greater danger.

Their exchange illustrates the difficult choices facing any government confronting a stronger adversary. A policy of restraint may preserve space for negotiation but risk encouraging further pressure. A policy of escalation may create leverage but also provoke retaliation that the initiating side cannot control.

The discussion also showed that the central question is not whether diplomacy is inherently good or bad. It is whether diplomacy can be supported by credible deterrence without turning into a cycle of escalation, and whether military pressure can be applied without destroying the very economic and political resources Iran seeks to protect.

For now, the two positions remain sharply divided. Izadi argues that the United States must be made to see continued pressure as a losing strategy. Baharvand argues that Iran must avoid actions that could give Washington the opportunity to intensify the conflict. Between those positions lies the unresolved strategic problem at the heart of the debate: how to change an adversary’s calculations while preventing the confrontation from becoming uncontrollable.