Beyond Shared Identity: Military Cooperation Across the Turkic States

Military cooperation among Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is becoming more practical and visible. Yet the arrangements linking them do not amount to a unified four-country alliance. Instead, cooperation is developing through several channels: a formal alliance between Azerbaijan and Türkiye, a separate treaty on allied relations between Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, and multilateral exercises that bring Central Asian and Caspian states together.

These arrangements create opportunities for joint training, personnel exchanges and operational coordination while allowing each government to retain its own security policy. Shared Turkic identity and diplomatic ties help bring the countries together, but practical military cooperation depends on more than political language. Exercises can build familiarity between units and test how forces communicate. They do not, by themselves, establish a joint command, common defense obligations or a permanent regional force.

A strong Azerbaijan–Türkiye partnership

The closest military relationship among the four countries is between Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The 2021 Shusha Declaration formalized their allied relationship and called for closer defense cooperation, including joint training, exercises, personnel exchanges and greater interoperability between their armed forces. It also provides for cooperation with the armed forces of other friendly states.

The declaration gives the partnership a more durable basis than shared rhetoric alone. It identifies areas for regular cooperation and signals that military ties form part of a broader strategic relationship. Türkiye’s role in training and defense cooperation is therefore especially significant for Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s relationship with Uzbekistan has also gained a formal political foundation. In August 2024, the two governments signed a Treaty on Allied Relations. The agreement establishes an allied framework between the two countries, but it should not be treated as evidence that Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have created a joint military command or a four-country defense pact.

Kazakhstan’s position is different. Its participation in multilateral exercises alongside Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan shows that military contacts extend beyond bilateral partnerships. The available examples, however, point to a flexible network of cooperation rather than a single structure binding all four countries to common defense commitments.

Exercises put cooperation to the test

Exercises offer a clearer view of how these relationships operate in practice. In July 2024, Azerbaijan sent personnel and equipment to Kazakhstan for the Birlestik exercise. The drill was organized under a plan signed by the defense ministries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It therefore brought together five countries, rather than the four examined here, and included activity at the Oymasha training ground and in the Caspian Sea.

Birlestik demonstrated that military cooperation can extend across Central Asia and the Caspian, with countries contributing personnel and different service branches to a shared exercise. It also illustrated the limits of the format. A multinational drill provides a venue for practice and coordination, but it does not automatically create permanent obligations or show that participants would act together in a real crisis.

A more recent example is Power of Unity–2026, a trilateral exercise involving Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan. It opened on 22 September at the Gizilgaya training center in Azerbaijan’s Khojavand region. Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry said the exercise was intended to improve practical skills, exchange experience and help participating units coordinate their tasks.

The exercise was notable for its geography as well as its participants. Command-and-staff training took place at sites in Khojavand, Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan’s Caspian sector. The training focused on headquarters deployment, the assessment of changing conditions, commanders’ decisions and coordination among the participating forces.

A later phase at the Boyuk-Zira training area involved Azerbaijani naval vessels and included scenarios such as protecting coastal infrastructure, clearing mines and responding to the seizure of a vessel. These were the Azerbaijani Defense Ministry’s stated objectives and exercise scenarios. They describe planned training rather than providing independent evidence of how effectively the forces performed.

Power of Unity provided a concrete example of Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Uzbekistan training together. Kazakhstan’s absence from that exercise is a reminder that participation varies by format. The wider pattern is a series of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, not a single bloc in which all four countries participate in every activity.

The practical value of growing ties

The immediate value of these exercises is practical. Troops from different countries can learn how their partners communicate, plan and carry out assigned tasks. Staff training can expose differences in procedures before a real emergency forces commanders to work through them under pressure. Repeated exercises can also make military contacts more routine.

The political signal is significant as well. Azerbaijan and Türkiye have a formal alliance, while Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan have signed their own treaty on allied relations. Exercises involving several states show that cooperation can reach beyond those bilateral ties. Taken together, these developments point to an increasingly active regional security network.

That network should not, however, be mistaken for a mutual-defense organization. The evidence does not show that Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have created a common command, agreed on a shared military doctrine or made a collective commitment to respond to an attack on any one of them. Those would be substantially deeper steps than holding joint drills or signing bilateral agreements.

Each government also has its own geography, security concerns and external relationships to manage. Cooperation can grow while national policies remain distinct. That flexibility may make joint activities politically workable, but it also limits how far coordination can go. Regular exercises do not necessarily resolve differences in equipment, communications, command structures or strategic priorities.

For the same reason, claims that this cooperation marks a coordinated break with Russia-led security structures would go beyond what these examples establish. The drills show that the countries can work together in selected formats; they do not, on their own, reveal how each government would balance its wider commitments in a crisis.

The most defensible conclusion is that military cooperation among Azerbaijan, Türkiye, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is becoming more active while remaining uneven. The Azerbaijan–Türkiye alliance provides the firmest bilateral foundation. Azerbaijan’s treaty with Uzbekistan adds another formal link, while exercises such as Birlestik and Power of Unity create opportunities to train across borders.

Whether these connections develop into a more institutionalized regional security arrangement will depend on continued exercises, sustained political coordination and a willingness to address the practical differences that joint training can expose.