Can the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz Be Bypassed?

## Executive assessment

The supplied evidence supports a narrower conclusion than the article’s central claim: alternative routes can diversify exports and provide limited contingency capacity, but the material does not demonstrate that they can fundamentally replace the Strait of Hormuz or the wider Gulf’s role in global energy and trade. The strongest case is for partial risk reduction, not strategic displacement.

## Verified within the supplied source

The source describes renewed interest in bypassing the Gulf and Strait of Hormuz amid what it characterizes as heightened regional insecurity and restrictions on maritime traffic. It identifies several proposed or existing alternatives:

- Increased use of overland oil pipelines and other routes, attributed to an estimate by Goldman Sachs of approximately 5 million additional barrels per day moving through alternative channels compared with the beginning of the conflict. - A proposed revival of the Iraq–Syria export route to the Mediterranean, described as an approximately 895-kilometre pipeline with a potential capacity of 2 million barrels per day. The source says the project would require technical and financial studies. - Planned or accelerated expansion of the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline in the United Arab Emirates, which already provides an outlet to the Gulf of Oman and is described in the source as capable of transporting most of the UAE’s oil production. - Saudi Arabia’s use of the East–West pipeline to Yanbu and consideration of broader changes to its transport and logistics infrastructure. - Discussions between Turkish and Saudi officials concerning a possible rail connection through Syria and Jordan, with a longer-term vision extending toward Oman.

The source also states that more than 20 million barrels per day of crude oil and petroleum products transit the Strait of Hormuz, and that the Gulf accounts for a major share of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies. However, the article provides no underlying datasets, publication dates for most cited figures, or independently checkable calculations in the supplied material.

## Analysis and interpretation

Alternative infrastructure can serve three practical purposes: diversifying export outlets, reducing the exposure of individual producers to a maritime chokepoint, and providing emergency capacity during disruptions. Pipelines to the Red Sea, Mediterranean or Gulf of Oman can therefore reduce—not eliminate—the amount of energy that must pass through Hormuz.

These alternatives face important constraints. Their capacity is limited relative to regional production and global demand; many projects remain proposed, under study or dependent on substantial investment; and their operation would remain vulnerable to political instability, conflict, sanctions, technical failures and attacks along the route. A new pipeline or railway also shifts the location of strategic vulnerability rather than removing it.

The distinction between bypassing the Strait and bypassing the Gulf is also important. Even if some exports can reach alternative ports, the producing states, processing facilities, storage systems, petrochemical complexes and regional trade networks remain geographically concentrated around the Gulf. A land route may reroute a commodity, but it cannot quickly reproduce the full combination of production scale, port infrastructure, processing capacity, commercial networks and established customer relationships found in the region.

The source’s argument is strongest regarding the short- and medium-term limits of substitution. It is weaker where it presents the Gulf’s position as wholly “irreplaceable” or treats all alternative projects as primarily political messaging. Infrastructure, energy-transition policies, new production outside the region, strategic stockpiles and changes in Asian import patterns could gradually reduce dependence without eliminating the Gulf’s significance. The relevant question is therefore not whether Hormuz will cease to matter, but how much traffic and strategic dependence can be diverted, at what cost and over what period.

## Key uncertainties and caveats

- The evidence is a single opinionated article and does not include the underlying Goldman Sachs, Kpler, Bloomberg, OPEC, U.S. Energy Information Administration, ICIS or GPCA datasets cited in the text. - Several claims concern events, projects or reports dated in 2026. Their status, implementation and capacity cannot be independently confirmed from the supplied evidence. - The article’s statements about a current war, repeated closure or severe restrictions in the Strait, and the effects on fuel prices are presented without corroborating evidence in the input. - The stated figures for oil transit, gas reserves, petrochemical trade and regional commerce require precise definitions and source verification. Transit volumes, production, exports and spare pipeline capacity are not interchangeable measures. - The proposed Iraq–Syria route and the Turkey–Saudi rail corridor appear, on the supplied record, to be dependent on further studies, political agreements, financing and security conditions. They should not be treated as operational substitutes. - The source attributes some motives—such as market management, psychological operations and weakening regional bargaining power—to media narratives and competing projects, but does not provide evidence sufficient to establish those motives as fact.

## Bottom line

The evidence supports the conclusion that bypass projects are real or being discussed and can improve resilience at the margin. It does not support the conclusion that they can soon displace the Strait of Hormuz or reproduce the Gulf’s wider economic and geopolitical role. The most defensible assessment is that diversification will continue, while Hormuz remains a critical chokepoint whose importance may be reduced incrementally but is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future.