Bypassing the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz: Mirage or Reality?

## A strategic question revived by insecurity

Renewed insecurity in the Persian Gulf and repeated restrictions on commercial shipping have brought an old question back to the centre of international debate: can energy and trade routes be redirected sufficiently to bypass the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz?

The question is no longer theoretical. According to the source material, the security crisis has affected the movement of commercial vessels, oil and gas tankers, petroleum products and other shipping in the Gulf and through the strait. In response, governments and companies have revisited pipelines, overland corridors, alternative ports and regional rail links designed to reduce dependence on the waterway.

These efforts are significant. They can provide redundancy, reduce the exposure of individual exporters and offer emergency capacity during periods of disruption. But redundancy is not the same as replacement. The evidence presented in the source material indicates that alternative routes may ease pressure in particular sectors or for particular exporters, while lacking the capacity, geographic reach and integrated infrastructure required to displace the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz from their central position in the global economy.

The distinction matters. A pipeline can reroute part of an oil producer’s exports. A railway can move selected categories of cargo across land. A different port can give a country access to an alternative coastline. None of these measures, individually or collectively, necessarily reproduces the scale, flexibility and interconnectedness of the maritime system centred on the Gulf.

## The rise of alternative routes

Several developments have been cited as evidence that the region’s importance is declining. The source material refers to analyses associated with Bloomberg and Goldman Sachs suggesting that regional oil exports are becoming less dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. One estimate cited in the material says that approximately five million additional barrels per day, compared with the beginning of the conflict discussed in the report, are being moved through pipelines and other alternative routes.

Such a shift would be consequential. Even a partial diversion can help exporters maintain deliveries when shipping is disrupted. It can also reduce the immediate market impact of a closure or severe restriction. Yet the same figure, as presented in the source, points to the limits of the argument as much as to its potential. Diverting several million barrels per day does not demonstrate that the entire regional energy system can operate independently of the Gulf and the strait. It demonstrates that some spare capacity exists outside the maritime chokepoint.

The source also describes a proposed revival of Iraq’s historic export route through Syria to the Mediterranean. Syria’s official news agency is cited as reporting agreements related to the reconstruction of the Haditha–Banias pipeline, linked to the Kirkuk–Banias system. The proposed 895-kilometre route is reportedly intended to carry up to two million barrels of Iraqi oil per day, with technical and financial studies to be undertaken by an international consortium reportedly led by Chevron, alongside UCC Holding and TI Capital.

For Iraq, such a route would diversify export options and reduce reliance on terminals connected to the Persian Gulf. For Syria, if implemented, it could create revenues from transit, storage, port operations, refining and logistics. The project could therefore have importance beyond the movement of crude oil.

But the proposal also illustrates the practical obstacles facing alternative corridors. The pipeline has a history of interruption linked to regional political disputes and security upheaval. The source states that it was ultimately taken out of service after suffering extensive damage during the 2003 war in Iraq. Its revival would require not only financing and engineering work, but also sustained political coordination and security along its entire route. An alternative corridor that crosses unstable or contested environments may exchange one category of vulnerability for another.

## Pipelines and ports: useful capacity, limited substitution

The source cites a July 2026 report by Kpler stating that Abu Dhabi was accelerating the construction of new phases and the expansion of the Habshan–Fujairah pipeline. The pipeline connects oil fields in the Habshan region of the United Arab Emirates to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz. According to the material, the 370-kilometre line has operated since 2012 and can carry approximately three-quarters of the UAE’s oil production—around 2.5 million barrels per day, as stated in the source—to Fujairah for export.

This is a clear example of how infrastructure can reduce exposure to a chokepoint. It allows an exporter to reach open waters without sending all of its crude through the strait. Similar arrangements can provide valuable resilience during a crisis and may improve an individual state’s bargaining position.

They do not, however, eliminate the Gulf’s wider role. The pipeline serves a specific producer and a specific flow of crude. It does not replace the large number of exporters, importers, terminals, shipping routes, storage facilities and industrial networks linked to the Gulf. Nor can it automatically provide a substitute for the movement of liquefied natural gas, petrochemical feedstocks, refined products and general cargo.

Saudi Arabia, the source reports, is also considering broader changes to its maritime, land-transport and economic corridors. In addition to exporting oil through Yanbu via the East–West Pipeline, Riyadh is reportedly examining ways to redesign commercial routes and strengthen overland connections.

A related initiative discussed in the source involves talks between Turkey’s transport minister, Abdulkadir Uraloğlu, and Saudi Transport and Logistics Services Minister Saleh bin Nasser Al-Jasser. The proposed railway would connect the two countries through Syria and Jordan, potentially reviving elements of the historic Hejaz Railway. The envisioned corridor would link Istanbul, Adana, Aleppo, Damascus, Amman, Medina, Mecca and Jeddah, with a longer-term possibility of extending the network towards Oman.

Supporters of such a project see it as a north–south transport corridor linking Europe with the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf of Oman. It could provide an additional channel for selected categories of goods and strengthen economic ties among participating states. Yet the source describes the proposal as a long-term undertaking. Its realization would depend on the restoration and maintenance of infrastructure across several countries, substantial investment, political agreement and a stable security environment. Those requirements make it a potential complement to maritime trade, rather than an imminent replacement for it.

## The infrastructure problem

The central weakness of claims that the Gulf can quickly be bypassed is the scale of the system being replaced. The Persian Gulf is not simply a route through which crude oil passes. It is a concentration of oil and gas reserves, export terminals, refineries, petrochemical plants, storage facilities, ports, shipping services and industrial consumers. These assets have been developed over decades and are connected to markets through commercial relationships, technical specifications and long-term contracts.

The source cites figures attributed to international energy institutions, including OPEC and the U.S. Energy Information Administration, according to which more than 20 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through the Strait of Hormuz each day. The material describes this as close to one-third of global seaborne oil trade. It further argues that, even under favourable conditions, routes outside the Gulf and Strait can handle no more than approximately one-third of the region’s oil production.

These figures are presented in the source as evidence that no alternative waterway or pipeline network can currently absorb the full volume. Their precise measurement and date would require independent verification, but the underlying logistical point is clear: redirecting a portion of exports is materially different from reproducing the entire system elsewhere.

The same applies to liquefied natural gas. The source states that the Gulf contains more than 40 percent of the world’s proven natural-gas reserves and that a substantial share of global LNG trade, particularly Qatar’s exports, moves through the waterway. LNG supply depends on a chain of highly specialized facilities, including production fields, processing plants, liquefaction units, storage, loading terminals, carriers and receiving infrastructure.

These systems are capital-intensive and designed for continuous operation. A prolonged security crisis could disrupt production, loading or shipping, even if some individual facilities remained intact. The source also emphasizes that large gas fields and processing complexes cannot necessarily be shut down and restarted as easily as some oil production. Pressure management, maintenance and technical continuity create additional constraints.

Long-term contracts add another layer of complexity. Exporters may face financial and legal consequences if they cannot deliver contracted volumes to customers in Europe or Asia. At the receiving end, power stations and industrial facilities are often configured around particular gas qualities and supply arrangements. Replacing one source with another may therefore require more than finding a different cargo; it may involve changes to equipment, contracts, shipping schedules and the wider industrial system.

## Beyond oil and gas

Arguments about bypassing the Gulf often focus on crude oil, but the region’s importance extends into petrochemicals and industrial materials. The source cites data attributed to ICIS and the Gulf Petrochemicals and Chemicals Association, claiming that the Gulf accounts for more than 31 percent of global exports of basic chemicals and polymers, including polyethylene and polypropylene, as well as a major share of methanol and urea.

The material also states that Gulf countries supply more than 54 percent of Asia’s naphtha imports and that China and India account for 28 percent and 23 percent, respectively, of Gulf petrochemical exports. These figures are included as reported claims in the source and are not independently assessed here. If accurate, they demonstrate how a disruption would affect not only fuel markets, but also plastics, packaging, manufacturing, agriculture and other industries dependent on chemical feedstocks.

Petrochemical production is difficult to relocate quickly. The Gulf’s advantage is not only its access to hydrocarbons, but also the concentration of production facilities, export terminals, storage capacity and accumulated technical expertise. Establishing comparable industrial clusters elsewhere would require very large investments, prolonged construction periods and reliable access to competitively priced energy.

For consumers, the consequences of disruption could extend through global supply chains. A factory in Asia or Europe may not import crude oil directly from the Gulf, yet it may rely on polymers, methanol, fertilizers or other intermediate products whose production or transport is linked to the region. This indirect dependence makes the Gulf’s role broader than a simple calculation of barrels shipped through a maritime chokepoint.

The source further places trade between Gulf states and major economic centres—including China, the European Union, the United States and Southeast Asia—at approximately $3 trillion. That figure, like the other statistics cited in the report, would require verification against current international trade data. The broader point is that Gulf ports function not only as gateways for local consumption, but also as major re-export and distribution hubs for West Asia and neighbouring regions.

## Resilience is not the same as replacement

Alternative routes can still be valuable. They can give exporters options, limit the consequences of a temporary closure and encourage investment in infrastructure that makes the global system less dependent on a single corridor. Diversification is particularly important where political and military risks are high.

But alternative capacity also has its own vulnerabilities. Pipelines cross borders and may become targets or bargaining instruments. Railways depend on uninterrupted security, compatible standards and reliable border procedures. Ports outside the Gulf may lack the storage, loading or processing capacity needed to absorb large additional flows. Overland routes can be more expensive than maritime transport, especially for bulk commodities. New projects may also take years or decades to complete.

The proposed Iraqi–Syrian pipeline, for example, would need a secure route across a region marked by past conflict. The proposed Turkey–Saudi railway would require political coordination across multiple jurisdictions. Maritime alternatives involving Oman or other regional states would still depend on port capacity, shipping availability and the security of adjacent waters. These are not arguments against the projects; they are reminders that infrastructure cannot be separated from the political environment in which it operates.

The source argues that some public narratives about the decline of the Gulf’s importance may serve political and commercial purposes. They may help manage financial-market expectations, influence energy prices, weaken the bargaining position of regional actors or attract investment to competing geopolitical projects. Such motives are possible, but claims about them should be treated as interpretations rather than established facts unless supported by independent evidence.

What can be assessed more directly is the structural character of the Gulf’s position. Geography cannot be moved. Existing reserves cannot be relocated. Industrial clusters, shipping networks and long-term commercial relationships cannot be recreated rapidly. A pipeline or railway can bypass a specific point of vulnerability, but it cannot easily reproduce the full network that has developed around the Persian Gulf over generations.

## A strategic reality, not an untouchable one

It would also be misleading to conclude that the Gulf’s strategic role is entirely immune to change. Energy transitions, new production technologies, changing consumption patterns, additional pipelines, expanded port infrastructure and shifting trade relationships can all reduce dependence at the margins. States will continue seeking ways to limit exposure to insecurity, and some alternatives may become more important over time.

The more defensible conclusion is narrower: the existence of alternative routes does not by itself prove that the Persian Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz is becoming irrelevant. The available evidence in the source material points instead to a process of partial diversification within a system that remains heavily centred on the Gulf.

The strategic question is therefore not whether the region can be bypassed in an absolute sense. Some cargoes, some exports and some emergency flows can be redirected. The question is whether the entire combination of energy, petrochemicals, shipping, re-export trade and geopolitical interdependence can be reproduced elsewhere at comparable scale, cost and reliability.

For the foreseeable future, the answer suggested by the evidence is no. Alternative infrastructure may reduce vulnerability, but it cannot remove the underlying importance of the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Stability and a durable regional security framework would therefore benefit not only the states bordering the waterway, but also the wider international economy that remains tied to it.

The Persian Gulf’s position is not merely the product of current shipping patterns. It is the result of geography, resource concentration, industrial investment, established trade networks and the involvement of regional and extra-regional powers. Those foundations can evolve, but they are unlikely to disappear because of a handful of new pipelines, ports or rail corridors. In that sense, the prospect of completely bypassing the Gulf remains less a settled reality than a strategic aspiration—one that may produce useful alternatives without overturning the region’s central place in global energy and trade.